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Most skills acquired through on-the-job training may be specific to an occupation 
and therefore transferable to some but not all firms.  This paper explores the relationship 
between the size of the local market for an occupation-specific skill and job-training 
outcomes.  The Stevens (1994) model of training predicts that as market size increases, job 
turnover increases and training becomes more general.  I test these predictions using data 
on blue-collar workers and variation in market size across U.S. metropolitan areas.  The 
empirical results support the theoretical predictions and the impacts are most relevant at 
low levels of market size. 
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1. Introduction 
Previous research on the economics of job training has been guided by Becker’s 
(1964) distinction between skills that are specific to a given firm and skills that are 
completely general.  While this distinction has been valuable at a conceptual level, it fails 
to describe the full range of training empirically.  Most skills learned on the job may be 
somewhere between the extremes of firm-specific and general; that is, the skills are 
transferable to some but not all firms.  In particular, some skills are specific to the type of 
work one does.  I show that when workers are imperfectly mobile across geographic areas, 
the nature of such occupation-specific skills depends on the local economic environment.  
This paper explores the relationship between the size of the local market for an occupation-
specific skill and job-training outcomes. 
Becker’s (1964) model of job training predicts sharp differences in training 
outcomes between general and firm-specific skills.  For example, the model predicts that 
workers bear the entire costs of general skills training but share with their employer the 
costs of firm-specific skills.  These differences suggest that the size of the local labor 
market might have fundamental effects on training decisions for occupation-specific skills.  
Recent theoretical work by Stevens (1994) provides a framework for investigating these 
effects.  She generalizes the Becker model to encompass the case of “transferable” 
training, which “is of some value to at least one firm in addition to the training firm” (p. 
540).  Consideration of transferable training, Stevens shows, leads naturally to issues of 
imperfect competition in the labor market. 
Two other areas of research provide motivation for this paper.  Recent empirical 
studies on wage determination provide evidence that occupation- and industry-specific    2 
skills play a significant role in earnings.  It is well-known that wages rise during a worker’s 
tenure with an employer (e.g., Topel 1991).  However, recent evidence indicates that much 
of the apparent return to employer tenure is in fact due to the accumulation of industry- 
and/or occupation-specific experience.  Evidence from Neal (1995) and Parent (2000) on 
wage growth with industry experience suggests the importance of industry-specific human 
capital.  On the other hand, Kambourov and Manovskii (2002) document substantial wage 
returns to occupational experience and emphasize occupation-specific human capital.
1 
A second area of research maintains Becker’s distinction between firm-specific and 
general skills, but challenges the assumption of perfect competition.  In Becker’s model, 
firms do not pay for general skills training because workers receive the benefits of training 
in the form of higher wages from other firms.  However, in practice firms seem to pay for 
some general skills training.  As a result, several authors have constructed theoretical 
models to explain firm-sponsored general training (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 1999; 
Autor 2001).  As Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, p. 80) explain, “in order to explain firms’ 
investments in general skills, some labor market imperfection must exist so that the 
mobility of workers is restricted and that employers earn rents on trained workers.”  In the 
present paper, the relevant imperfection is limited geographic mobility of workers.  This 
force, together with the specialization that comes with training in occupation-specific 
skills, provides firms some market power and thus an incentive to invest in transferable 
                                                            
 
1 Neal (1995) looks at displaced workers and finds that the wage cost of switching industries is strongly 
correlated with pre-displacement measures of both work experience and tenure.  Parent (2000) adds a 
measure of experience in the current industry to a wage-tenure regression and finds that the return to tenure 
with the current employer is reduced markedly.  Kambourov and Manovskii (2002) find that when 
occupational experience is also taken into account, it is occupational experience rather than industry 
experience that is of primary importance in explaining wages.    3 
skills.  More generally, this is one example of recent interest within labor economics in 
issues of imperfect competition and market power (Bhaskar, Manning, and To 2002). 
The next section outlines Stevens’ (1994) model of on-the-job training.  The model 
predicts that as market size increases, job turnover among trained workers increases and 
training becomes more general.  Section 3 describes my empirical strategy for testing these 
predictions using data on blue-collar workers and variation in market size across U.S. 
metropolitan areas.  Section 4 relates market size to job turnover using data from the 
Current Population Survey.  Section 5 relates market size to the generality of training using 
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and the Employment Opportunity 
Pilot Project survey of firms. 
The empirical results support the theoretical predictions: in thicker markets, job 
turnover is greater and training is more general.  In each case, the effects of market size are 
most important at low levels of market size.  This suggests that the Stevens model is most 
relevant to cases where occupation-specific skills are transferable to a relatively small 
number of firms. 
2. Theory 
2.1 Description 
In this section, I summarize the Stevens (1994) model of job training.  For the 
present purpose, consider the labor market as a metropolitan area in which the workers are 
limited to working in that area.  In this metropolitan economy, there are many workers and 
firms, and we assume constant returns to labor within a firm.  This allows us to focus on 
the training decisions at a single firm, called firm 0.  Initially, all workers are untrained and    4 
have constant productivity, initialized to zero, in all firms.  A random group of these 
workers is attached to firm 0. 
The timing of the model is as follows.  There are two periods: a training period and 
a work period.  In the first period, each worker and firm 0 decide whether or not to train 
and, if so, choose the level of training.  The level of training is chosen to maximize the 
joint return of the worker and firm, net of training costs.  At the start of the second period, 
the worker enters the labor market and then works for the training firm or some other firm. 
The firm offers a type of training that is potentially useful in n other firms in the 
metropolitan area.  The post-training productivity of the worker is given by the vector 
 ,...) 0 , 0 , ,..., , , ( 2 1 0 n v v v v v = , (1) 
where  n i ,..., 1 =  indexes the other firms that employ the skill in the area.  The size of the 
external market, n, is taken to be exogenous.  To generate the possibility of labor turnover, 
the model makes the productivity components  i v  uncertain during training.  This reflects 
uncertainty about either the worker’s productivity within a firm or the future demand for a 
firm’s output.  Productivity is realized at the start of the second period. 
The training consists of two elements: a transferable element and a specific 
element.  The transferable element  0 ≥ m  is equally useful in the training firm and the n 
other firms, while the specific element  0 ≥ a  is useful only in the training firm.  As a 
result, the expected value of the training is equal in all external firms, but may be greater in 
the training firm: 
  ,...) 0 , 0 , ,..., , , ( ) ( m m m a m v E + = . (2)    5 
The random shocks are represented by independent and identically distributed random 
variables  i ε ,  n i ,..., 1 , 0 = , with mean zero and support  ] 1 , 1 [− .
2  Therefore, the complete 
productivity vector is: 
 ,...) 0 , 0 , ,..., , , ( 2 1 0 n m m m a m v ε ε ε ε + + + + + = . (3) 
The cost of providing a level of training  ) , ( a m  is given by the function  ) , ( a m C , which is 
increasing and convex in m  and a.  This cost represents both the direct financial cost of 
the training and the foregone output of the worker during training. 
  After becoming trained, the worker enters the labor market and can work for the 
training firm or any of the n external firms.  At this stage, the worker’s true productivity in 
each firm is revealed and becomes public knowledge.  Each of the  1 + n  firms makes 
simultaneous wage offers to the worker and the worker chooses to work for the firm 
offering the highest wage.  Since the worker’s true productivity varies across firms, firms 
have some market power over trained workers.  As the outcome of the bidding, the worker 
works at the firm at which he has the highest productivity, at a wage equal to the next-
highest productivity among the other firms. 
  Since firms have market power over trained workers, each of the external firms 
shares in the expected returns to the training.  Even though it doesn’t pay for the training, 
an external firm benefits from it if the worker’s realized productivity is highest in the firm.  
This feature distinguishes the model from the Becker model of investment in general and 
                                                            
 
2 The independence assumption is convenient, but it is only necessary that the shocks are not perfectly 
correlated across firms.  For instance, the shocks might be industry-specific and arise from variation in 
product demand.  Since most occupations are employed in more than one industry, this would produce a 
pattern where the shocks are not perfectly correlated across the set of firms that are relevant for a given 
trained worker.    6 
firm-specific skills, in which the training firm and the worker share the full amount of the 
return. 
2.2 Predictions 
  This paper tests two predictions of the Stevens model.  The first prediction is that 
job turnover increases with market size.  The second prediction is that training becomes 
more general as market size increases.  This section highlights the mechanisms behind 
these predictions; for a more formal treatment, see Stevens (1994) and Appendix A of the 
present paper.
3 
  The first prediction of interest concerns job turnover – the movement of the worker 
from the training firm to one of the external firms in the second period.  In the model, 
turnover depends on the number of external firms (i.e., market size) and the training levels 
chosen, and these training levels may also depend on market size.  As market size 
increases, the model predicts that turnover increases.  This prediction operates through two 
channels: a direct effect and an indirect effect.   
The direct effect is the impact of market size on turnover for a given level of 
training.  As market size increases, there are more competitors for workers from the 
training firm.  Therefore, it is more likely that the worker’s highest realized productivity 
will be in one of the external firms.  The indirect effect of market size on turnover reflects 
the impact of market size on the choice of training levels.  In a larger market, turnover is 
greater (via the direct effect) and therefore there is a smaller incentive to invest in the 
specific element.  Reducing the specific element increases turnover even further and thus 
                                                            
 
3 In Appendix A, I analyze a special case of the model in which there is no specific element and the random 
shocks are uniformly distributed.    7 
the indirect effect reinforces the direct effect.  The combined effect is that job turnover 
increases with market size.   
  In contrast to the specific element, the choice of the transferable element m  does 
not depend directly on market size.  Due to the separability of the shocks and m  in the 
production function, the marginal benefit of an increase in m  is independent of market size 
n.  An increase in m  increases the worker’s expected productivity in each of the  1 + n  
firms, raising the worker’s wage in proportion to the increase in m  without affecting the 
returns to any of the firms (i.e., the marginal benefit of m  is equal to 1).  As a result, 
market size can affect the choice of m  only via interactions with the specific element a in 
the cost function  ) , ( a m C .  If, for example, m  and a were separable in the cost function, 
then the equilibrium level of m  would be independent of market size. 
The second prediction of interest in the model concerns the relationship between 
market size and training levels.  As I have explained, the primary impact of market size is 
on the specific element rather than the transferable element.  In the empirical work, I base 
my test on the share of total training that is transferable as opposed to specific, i.e., 
) ( a m m + .  The model clearly predicts that the specific element a decreases with n, 
while the relationship between n and the transferable element m  depends somewhat on 
the cost function.  Assume that the cross-partial of the cost function is non-negative: 
0 /
2 ≥ ∂ ∂ ∂ m a C .  Then the equilibrium level of m  is either independent of n or increasing    8 
in n.  As a result, the model predicts that  ) ( a m m + , which I call the “generality of 
training,” is increasing in n.
4 
  The impact of market size on the wages of trained workers is perhaps surprising.  
When market size increases, wages do not necessarily increase due to the combination of 
two opposing effects.  First, an increase in market size creates more competition for trained 
workers and increases wages.  Second, the specific element is smaller with a larger market, 
leading to lower productivity in the training firm and thus lower wages.  The same 
ambiguity would likely translate to the wage-tenure profile, which further depends on how 
training costs are divided between the worker and the training firm. 
2.3 Comparison to Other Models 
  In preparation for testing the predictions of the Stevens model, it is useful to 
compare the predictions to those of other models.  My primary goal in this section is to 
discuss alternative explanations for the predictions of the Stevens model on turnover and 
type of training.  These explanations come from two sources: other models of training and 
models of labor-market search. 
Becker’s (1964) model of training doesn’t explicitly consider the role of market 
size, but he made some conjectures that turn out to be consistent with Stevens’ predictions 
on turnover and the generality of training.  Becker assumed a perfectly competitive labor 
market and considered the polar cases of general and firm-specific training.  With general 
training, firms would not care about turnover of trained workers, since workers would bear 
the full costs of their training.  With firm-specific training, on the other hand, firms would 
                                                            
 
4 In general, the relationship between m  and n  depends on the sign of  m a C ∂ ∂ ∂
2 .  My assumption that 
0
2 ≥ ∂ ∂ ∂ m a C  is sufficient but not necessary for generality to be increasing in n .  If  0
2 < ∂ ∂ ∂ m a C , m is    9 
lose their investments if trained workers left the firm.  Therefore, he suggested that firms 
would share with workers some of the returns to firm-specific training (and, hence, some 
of the costs) in order to reduce the chances of turnover.
5 
  Becker acknowledged that much on-the-job training is neither firm-specific nor 
completely general, but he argued that such training can be considered as “the sum of two 
components, one completely general, the other completely specific” (p. 44).
6  In the case 
where training is transferable to a small number of firms, Becker said that the effect on 
training is “difficult to assess,” but conjectured that such training would be more like 
specific training than general training because of the monopsony power held by firms (pp. 
50-51).  Combining these conjectures, Becker’s model would predict that as market size 
increases, the role of general training becomes more important and, as a result, turnover 
increases.
7 
In addition to models of training,
8 models of search and matching within an urban 
context might generate predictions similar to the Stevens model for the relationship 
between turnover and market size.  Since search costs are presumably lower in larger 
markets, static models of search (e.g., Wheeler 2001) predict that workers and firms are 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
decreasing in n  but generality would still be increasing in n  if the change in a  dominates the change in m. 
5 Hashimoto (1981) arrives at the same conclusion, but argues that sharing results from concerns about 
transactions costs rather than turnover. 
6 While Becker’s claim provides good intuition in many cases, it is not generally true.  Stevens (1994) shows 
that some transferable training cannot be considered strictly a sum of general and firm-specific components. 
7 In terms of wages, Becker’s model is not consistent with the prediction of the Stevens model on wages.  
Working through the intuition of the Becker model, one would expect that the wage-tenure profile becomes 
steeper with a larger market, since training becomes more general and the wage-tenure profile is steeper for 
general skills.  However, the impact of market size on wages in the Stevens model is ambiguous, as 
explained above. 
8 Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999) develop models to explain firm-sponsored general training.  However, 
their models involve perfect competition among employers, so the models don’t have any implications about    10 
more suitably matched in larger areas.
9  In a dynamic setting, lower search costs might also 
lead to greater turnover in larger markets, but this would seem to depend on how agents 
learn over time about the quality of their matches.  In particular, one would expect search 
considerations to be important for young workers, since they are actively learning about 
their abilities and interests. 
3. Empirical Strategy 
My empirical work tests two predictions of the Stevens model: as market size 
increases, (1) job turnover among trained workers increases and (2) the generality of 
training increases.  My empirical strategy relies on variation in market size across 
metropolitan areas.  This approach treats the worker’s current area as the relevant labor 
market.  To support this, I limit my analysis to blue-collar workers, who are less 
geographically mobile than are other workers.  The working assumption is that these 
workers are perfectly mobile within their local labor market but immobile across markets.  
Mobility across areas is limited by costs involved in changing residences and searching for 
jobs in a different area. 
Some evidence on the limited mobility of blue-collar workers is presented in Table 
1.  Over both the 1-year and 5-year periods ending in 1990, blue-collar workers had lower 
rates of mobility across states than did workers in other occupations.  Between 1985 and 
1990, for example, data from the 1990 Census of Population indicate that 7 percent of 
blue-collar workers moved between states, compared to 13 percent among white-collar 
workers and 10 percent among workers in clerical, sales, or service occupations. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
the role of market size on training.  In addition, all training is perfectly general in their models and therefore 
they do not address the balance of general and specific training.    11 
3.1 Defining Local Labor Markets 
I define local labor markets using metropolitan areas.  The general concept of a 
metropolitan area (MA) is “that of a core area containing a large population nucleus, 
together with adjacent communities that have a high degree of economic and social 
integration with that core” (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994, p. 13-1).  More concretely, 
MAs contain one or more central counties and may include outlying counties with a close 
connection to the central counties, based on commuting patterns and population density.  
MAs are a suitable construct for local labor markets because workers generally can change 
jobs within an MA without changing their residence.  MAs range in total population from 
around 50,000 to 1 million or more. 
The federal government distinguishes between three types of MAs: metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSAs), primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSAs), and consolidated 
metropolitan statistical areas (CMSAs).  The MSAs represent relatively free-standing 
metropolitan areas, while the CMSAs represent large metropolitan regions that contain two 
or more PMSAs.  For example, the Washington-Baltimore CMSA contains the 
Washington, DC PMSA; the Baltimore, MD PMSA; and the Hagerstown, MD PMSA.  I 
use a combination of MSAs and PMSAs in this analysis.  In combining data from various 
sources, I use consistent definitions of metropolitan areas as of June 30, 1997.  At this 
time, there were 328 MAs in the 50 states and the District of Columbia, including 255 
MSAs and 73 PMSAs. 
I classify blue-collar workers into detailed occupations using the occupational 
classification system developed for the 1990 census.  I start with 3-digit occupations within 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
9 Another benefit of pooling workers and firms in cities is to reduce risk associated with industry-specific    12 
the broad categories of “Precision Production, Craft, and Repair Occupations” and 
“Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers.”  In line with the theory, I drop occupations that 
don’t require much in the way of training – for example, helpers and laborers.  I also drop 
codes for supervisors of blue-collar workers and non-specific codes such as “not elsewhere 
classified.”  I combine some closely related occupations into a single category in order to 
avoid small cells and to make the data comparable with the OES classification system 
(described below).  Finally, I drop occupations for which the market definition is 
problematic.
10  This leaves 103 occupations; examples are aircraft engine mechanics, 
carpenters, tool and die makers, and printing press operators. 
3.2 Measuring Market Size 
  I construct measures of market size for each occupation in each MA using 1998 
data from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey.  The OES survey is an 
annual mail survey from the Bureau of Labor Statistics measuring occupational 
employment and wages for wage and salary workers in non-farm establishments, by 
industry.
11  The OES survey samples and contacts approximately 400,000 establishments 
each year and, over 3 years, contacts approximately 1.2 million establishments.  The 1998 
data are therefore based on survey results from 1996, 1997, and 1998. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
shocks (Simon 1988; Diamond and Simon 1990). 
10 That is, workers in those occupations are likely to switch to a different occupation or move to a different 
area.  These judgments are based on tabulations from the March CPS (see Section 4.1).  Occupational 
mobility is judged by comparing occupation at the time of the survey to occupation in the longest job in the 
previous year.  Geographic mobility is judged by comparing state of residence at the time of the survey to 
state of residence in the previous year. 
11 An establishment is defined as an economic unit that processes goods or provides services, such as a 
factory, store, or mine.  The establishment is generally at a single physical location and is engaged primarily 
in one type of economic activity.  The OES survey includes establishments in most industries, but excludes 
those in agricultural production, forestry, fishing, the postal service, and the federal government.  For the 
micro-level data sets used in connection with the OES data, I exclude workers in those industries from the 
analysis.    13 
  The OES data provide a measure of market size that is consistent with the 
theoretical model presented in Section 2.  That measure is the number of establishments 
that employ workers of a given occupation in a given metropolitan area.  The OES survey 
defines occupations using 5-digit codes from the OES classification system.  I developed a 
crosswalk between the OES and Census systems and use it to convert the OES data to 
Census occupation groups.
12  The OES data cover every MA but, due to confidentiality 
and data quality criteria, they do not cover every occupation within a given MA.  In 
particular, occupation-MA cells are not reported if there are fewer than 3 establishments 
for a given cell or if one establishment contains 80 percent or more of the employment in a 
given cell. 
Summary statistics on the number of establishments in an occupation-MA are 
presented in the first row of Table 2.  This measure of market size is right-skewed, 
reflecting the concentration of economic activity in relatively few geographic areas.  The 
mean number of establishments in an occupation-MA is 43 and the median is 17.  There 
exists a fair amount of variation across cells: from 6 establishments at the 10
th percentile to 
93 establishments at the 90
th percentile. 
                                                            
 
12 In cases where Census occupations are composed of multiple OES occupations (about half of the Census 
occupations), it is challenging to construct my measure of market size.  I want to measure the number of 
establishments employing any of the component OES occupations.  The appropriate method for aggregation 
depends on the degree of overlap between the sets of establishments employing each OES occupation; 
however, this overlap is not observable in my OES data set.  In the case of perfect overlap, the maximum 
among the component OES occupations is appropriate.  At the other extreme of no overlap, the sum of 
establishment counts is appropriate.  Since the OES occupations for a given Census occupation are 
necessarily closely related, I use the maximum.    14 
4. Job Turnover and Market Size 
4.1 Data 
I test the prediction on job turnover using data from the March Current Population 
Surveys (CPS) for 1990-2002.  The CPS is a monthly survey of 60,000 households 
conducted by the Census Bureau for the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The Annual Income 
Supplement to the March CPS collects information on employment and income in the 
previous calendar year.  It contains a question on the number of employers each individual 
had during the year; specifically, the question reads: “For how many employers did you 
work in [year]?  If more than one at the same time, only count it as one employer.”  The 
response is coded as zero, one, two, or three-or-more employers.  Since those who had 
more than one employer must have changed employers at some point, I use this question to 
construct a measure of job turnover.  This measure is simply an indicator for having more 
than one employer in the previous year.  This captures all employer-to-employer 
transitions but does not capture all separations, since individuals who separated from their 
employer but were unemployed for the remainder of the year would be counted as having 
only one employer. 
Although this question from the March CPS was not designed to measure turnover, 
measures of turnover based on it are consistent with turnover data collected in other CPS 
surveys.  Farber (1999) computed aggregate rates of job change based on this measure and 
compared them to those based on the Tenure Supplements to the CPS.  Over the 1975-
1995 period, the average rate of job change in the March data is 15.3%.  Considering the 
downward bias noted above, this corresponds well to the fraction of workers who have 
been in their job less than one year.  This latter measure averaged 18.6% over the 1979-   15 
1996 period.  Stewart (2003) matched the March 1987 Income Supplement to the January 
1987 Tenure Supplement, providing two reports of employment transitions for the same 
period for each individual.  He found that the transitions were identical in both reports for 
nearly 80 percent of the cases and were consistent with each other for 90 percent of the 
cases. 
I restrict the sample to blue-collar workers between the ages of 18 and 64 who had 
at least one employer in the previous year, live in an MA, and are not self-employed.
13  In 
my sample period, the CPS recorded occupations using the classification system developed 
for the 1990 census.  As described in Section 3.1, I use 103 occupation categories for blue-
collar workers.  For a given year of the March CPS, these procedures yield a sample of 
about 7,000 workers.  A sample of this size is too small to support my empirical strategy, 
which relies on detail within occupations and MAs.  Therefore, I pool the data over 13 
years of the March CPS from 1990 to 2002 and control for year effects in the analysis. 
My empirical strategy exploits variation in market size across MAs.  In order to 
protect respondent confidentiality, the public-use CPS files do not identify the particular 
MA for workers in the smallest MAs.  This prevents me from linking their records to the 
OES data on market size.  As a result, my CPS sample is limited to workers from 262 of 
the 328 MAs.  Excluding the smallest MAs tends to reduce the variation in market size at 
the lower end of the distribution within the OES data, as shown in the second row of Table 
                                                            
 
13 Since the turnover measure is based on employment in the previous year, I identify the worker’s 
occupation and other job-related variables based on the longest job held in the previous year.  (The March 
CPS does not collect this information about any other jobs held in the previous year.)  The only exception to 
this rule is union status, which is based on the worker’s current job since that information is not reported for 
the longest job held in the previous year.  I also exclude workers who had less than one year of potential 
experience as of March of the previous year.    16 
2.  In the CPS sample, the median number of establishments for an occupation-MA is 27, 
compared to 17 in the overall OES data. 
Table 3 presents sample means for the individual-level data from the CPS sample.  
The share of workers who had multiple employers in the previous year is 15 percent.  As 
one might expect in a sample of blue-collar workers, the typical worker is a male with a 
high-school education.  The sample covers a range of ages: half of the sample is between 
30 and 45 years of age, with about one quarter less than 30 and one quarter greater than 45. 
4.2 Specification 
I estimate the effect of market size on job turnover using the specification: 
  om om om o om Z size turnover ε γ β α + + + = ' , (4) 
where o refers to occupation and m  refers to MA.  The dependent variable is the share of 
workers with occupation o in MA m  who had multiple employers in the previous year.  
The key independent variable is the measure of market size from the OES data: the number 
of establishments in MA m  that employ workers in occupation o.  The theory predicts 
that job turnover increases with market size:  0 > β .  Since equation (4) includes 
occupation fixed effects  ) ( o α , β  is identified from variation in market size across MAs 
within occupations. 
 The  vector  om Z  includes a variety of other variables that might affect turnover.  It 
includes firm size since it is well known that turnover is lower in larger firms (Idson 1996; 
Oi and Idson 1999).
14  It includes variables for other job characteristics: industry, union 
status, part-time work, and public-sector employment.  It also includes standard    17 
demographic variables and indicators for each year of the CPS sample.  Finally, to control 
for effects at the aggregate level,  om Z  includes the population of the MA in 1999 and 
population growth in the MA between 1990 and 1999, based on Census Bureau population 
estimates. 
  To estimate equation (4) with the CPS sample, I group workers into occupation-
MA cells and average the individual information within each cell, leaving a dataset of 
10,004 observations.  For each occupation-MA in the CPS data, the OES data give the 
number of establishments.  Even with 13 years of CPS data, there are relatively few 
workers in each cell: the group sizes range from 1 to 785, with a median of 3.  To account 
for the heteroskedasticity induced by variation in group size, I use a two-step GLS 
estimator (Dickens 1990).  In the first step, I estimate the extent to which the error in a cell 
varies with group size.  Estimates of error-components variances from the first stage are 
then used to construct a weight for a weighted least squares estimator.
15 
  In addition to the simple linear specification in equation (4), I also estimate a 
piecewise linear specification that allows the effect of market size to vary with the level of 
market size.  The Stevens model suggests that the effect of market size on job turnover is 
greatest at low levels of market size.  In the example analyzed in Appendix A, for instance, 
the probability of job turnover as a function of the number of establishments displays the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
14 Several reasons have been given for why turnover is lower in larger firms, including: (1) larger firms are 
less likely to go out of business, (2) monitoring costs are greater in larger firms, and (3) larger firms are more 
likely to use incentive contracts. 
15 The qualitative results are robust to limiting the sample to cells with 3 or more workers, or to cells with 5 
or more workers.    18 
nonlinear relationship shown in Figure 1.  As market size increases, job turnover increases 
rapidly at low levels of market size and increases only marginally beyond that.
16 
4.3 Results 
  In the simple linear specification, increases in market size are not associated with 
greater job turnover (Table 4).  The estimate of β  is positive, as expected, but its 
magnitude is quite small.  An increase in market size from the 10
th percentile to the 90
th 
percentile would, according to the estimate, increase job turnover by less than 1 percentage 
point.  This is perhaps not surprising, since much of the variation in the data is at the high 
end of the market-size distribution, where the model suggests the effect of market size is 
negligible. 
  In contrast, the piecewise linear specification offers some support for the prediction 
of the model.  When market size is 10 establishments or less, increases in market size are 
associated with greater job turnover and the effect is statistically significant.  In contrast, 
the estimated effects for the other two ranges are negligible.  Taking the point estimates at 
face value, an increase of market size by 5 establishments in the first range (≤10 
establishments) increases turnover by 2.0 percentage points, in the second range (10-30) 
decreases turnover by 0.02 percentage points, and in the third range (30+) increases 
turnover by 0.01 percentage points.  This empirical relationship is shown in Figure 2.  As 
the figure demonstrates, the important variation in market size appears to be at the lowest 
levels. 
                                                            
 
16 For simplicity, the example in Appendix A ignores the specific element a .  However, including it in the 
model doesn’t change the main point of Figure 1.  In particular, for a given value of a , the relationship 
between turnover and market size follows the nonlinear pattern in Figure 1.  Changing the value of a  merely 
shifts the entire curve up or down.    19 
  Turning to the other variables in the model, the effects of the control variables on 
turnover are generally in the expected direction.  Notably, turnover is higher for younger 
workers and part-time workers.  Turnover is lower for workers in large firms and workers 
in the public sector.  In addition, workers in larger cities (in terms of population) have 
lower turnover, all else equal, although the effect is small.  This is consistent with evidence 
that larger cities have lower unemployment rates (Gan and Zhang 2003). 
  While the empirical results are consistent with the Stevens model, there might be 
other explanations for the results.  In particular, turnover might be higher in larger markets 
because of lower search costs (see Section 3.2).  Therefore, I provide a further test of the 
Stevens model based on differences in training requirements among blue-collar 
occupations.  If the turnover effect reflects training, then it should be greater for 
occupations involving more training.  In contrast, if the turnover effect reflects search 
costs, then the effect of market size on turnover shouldn’t vary with training requirements. 
  I measure training time in an occupation using Specific Vocational Preparation 
(SVP) scores from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.  SVP is the “amount of lapsed 
time required by a typical worker to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and 
develop the facility needed for average performance in a specific job-worker situation” 
(U.S. Department of Labor 1993, p. B-1).  SVP includes formal vocational education as 
well as on-the-job training.  SVP is measured on a nine-point scale, with each level 
corresponding to a range of training times.  I use the measures of training time for Census 
occupations from England and Kilbourne (1988).  For the occupations in my data, training 
time ranges from 6 months at the 10
th percentile to 44 months at the 90
th percentile, with a 
median of 25 months.    20 
I implement this test by adding interaction terms between market size and training 
time in the turnover equation.  The Stevens model predicts that the coefficients on the 
interaction terms are positive, while the search story predicts that the coefficients are zero.  
Since the effect of market size on turnover is positive only in the lowest range of market 
size, the coefficient of interest here is on the training-time interaction for this range.  The 
estimate of this coefficient is positive, as predicted by the Stevens model (Table 5, column 
2).  However, it is not statistically significant and the magnitude of the effect is rather 
small.  For instance, the estimates imply that the effect on turnover of increasing market 
size by 5 establishments in the lowest range, which is 2.0 percentage points overall, is only 
0.2 percentage points higher for an occupation with 2 years longer training time.
17  
Therefore, this second test does not provide additional support for the Stevens model. 
5. Generality of Training and Market Size 
  In this section, I test the theoretical prediction that on-the-job training is more 
general the larger is the size of the local market for an occupation.  Ideally, a test would 
involve the empirical counterparts of the training components in the model: the specific 
component a and transferable component m .  However, I am not aware of any data 
sources that include such measures.
18  Therefore, I base my test on responses to unique 
survey questions on how much of the skills workers learn during training are transferable 
to other firms.  The evidence in this section is based on worker responses in the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 and employer responses in the Employment 
                                                            
 
17 For instance, the implied effect is 1.86 percentage points for an occupation with 1 year of training time and 
2.04 percentage points for an occupation with 3 years of training time. 
18 For a critical review of available data on training, see Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999a).    21 
Opportunity Pilot Project survey.  The second survey allows a further test of the model 
based on the wage returns to relevant experience. 
5.1 Evidence from the NLSY 
  The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) is an ongoing study of 
labor market and other experiences of a cohort that was age 14-21 in 1979.  For the first 
and only time in 1993, when respondents were age 28-36, the NLSY included a series of 
questions on the generality of skills learned at the start of the worker’s current job.
 19  First, 
the survey asked workers: “When you started doing this kind of work for [employer], 
about what percentage of the duties you currently do were you able to perform 
adequately?”  For those who initially performed less than 100 percent of their current 
duties adequately, the survey then asked whether they received any of the following kinds 
of training when they were learning to perform their job duties: classes or seminars, time 
with supervisor, time with co-workers, and self-study materials.
20  For each kind reported, 
the survey then asked: “How many of the skills that you learned in [training kind] do you 
think would be useful in doing the SAME kind of work you are doing for an employer 
other than [current employer]?”  There are five possible responses: all or almost all, more 
than half, about half, less than half, and none or almost none. 
  I construct a sample of blue-collar workers in the 1993 NLSY data who live in 
MAs and are not self-employed.  As shown in Table 6, 251 workers in the sample reported 
at least one kind of training at the start of their job.  The most common kinds are guidance 
                                                            
 
19 The survey also asked workers to report the generality of (formal and informal) training in the previous 
year.  I base my analysis on the questions regarding training at the start of the job because the theory outlined 
in Section 2 refers to training at the start of the job.  For more discussion of the 1993 training data, see 
Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999a, 1999b).    22 
from supervisors and guidance from co-workers.  The last column of the table shows the 
share of those reporting each kind of training who said that “all or almost all” of the skills 
are transferable.  Overall, 64 percent of training is considered to be fully general.  Across 
kinds of training, this measure ranges from 58 percent for self-study materials to 83 
percent for classes and seminars. 
In order to determine whether workers in larger markets are more likely to report 
their training to be general, I estimate a regression of the form: 
  i i i om i i Z kind size occ general ε γ β + + + + = '.  ( 5 )    
The dependent variable equals 1 if worker i reported that “all or almost all” of the skills 
learned in training are transferable, and equals 0 otherwise.  Equation (5) follows the same 
structure as the turnover equation (4), with the key independent variable representing 
market size for the occupation in the MA.  However, due to the smaller sample in the 
NLSY, equation (5) is more parsimonious in certain respects than the turnover equation. 
First, instead of including a full set of occupation fixed effects, I group the 103 
blue-collar occupations into six categories and include indicators for these groups  ) ( i occ  in 
the regression.  Second, I parameterize market size into three groups: 30 or less, 31-100, 
and more-than-100 establishments in the occupation-MA (from the OES data).  The 
regression includes indicators for the second and third groups, with the effects measured 
relative to the first group.  The specification also includes indicators for the kind of 
training ) ( i kind  and a set of control variables  i Z  similar to that in the turnover model.
21 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
20 Self-study materials are described in the questionnaire as: “any self-study material or self-instructional 
packages, such as manuals, workbooks, or computer-assisted teaching programs.” 
21 The standard errors are adjusted for the non-independence of observations within occupation/MA cells.  
This accounts for clustering on two levels.  First, there is clustering at the occupation/MA level since the    23 
The estimated impacts of market size on the generality of training are in the 
direction predicted by the Stevens model (Table 7).  Compared to workers in markets with 
30 or fewer establishments that employ their occupation, workers in markets with 31-or-
more establishments are 10-11 percentage points more likely to report their training to be 
general.  These impacts cannot be explained by overall MA size, since MA population is 
also included in the model and has a positive estimated impact on generality.  While effects 
of this magnitude are definitely important, they are not statistically significant for this 
sample because the associated standard errors are large. 
5.2 Evidence from the EOPP 
Another source of data for relating generality and market size is the Employment 
Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) survey of firms in 1982.  This survey was administered 
in 28 local areas that were sites for the EOPP labor market experiments in the late 1970s.  
The sites are concentrated in the South and Midwest, and about half are MAs.  The 1982 
survey was the second wave of a two-wave longitudinal survey of employers in these 
areas.  The first wave, conducted in 1979 to evaluate the EOPP experiments, oversampled 
firms with a relatively high proportion of low-wage workers.  The second wave attempted 
to interview all respondents to the first wave and obtained a response rate of about 70 
percent. 
In the 1982 survey, each employer provided information on the last worker hired 
prior to August 1981.  I restrict the analysis to workers in the same set of blue-collar 
occupations used in the CPS and NLSY samples.  Employers report the generality of on-
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
measure of market size is measured at this level.  (However, there are nearly as many individuals in my 
NLSY sample as there are occupation/MA groups.)  Second, there is clustering at the individual level since 
individuals reporting multiple types of training contribute multiple observations to the regression.    24 
the-job training for the last worker hired by answering the question, “How many of the 
skills learned by new employees in this job are useful outside the company?”  The majority 
of employers in my sample (63 percent) responded that “almost all” of the skills were 
useful in other firms, while the rest responded that “most,” “some,” or “almost none” of 
the skills were useful in other firms.  In the next question, employers assessed the local 
market size for the occupation: “Focusing on the skills that are useful outside your 
company, how many other companies in the local labor market have jobs that require these 
skills?”  The responses were spread fairly evenly over the four ranges provided in the 
survey: less than 5, 5-15, 16-100, and more than 100. 
Following my analysis of the NLSY data, I compare the generality of training to 
the size of the local market for occupation-specific skills.  I estimate a specification similar 
to equation (5), with the dependent variable equal to 1 if the employer reported that 
“almost all” of the skills were useful in other companies; and 0 otherwise.  As in the 
NLSY, the results indicate that training is more likely to be general in areas with more 
companies having jobs using the skills (Table 8).  Compared to markets with fewer than 5 
companies using the skills, employers in markets with 5-15 companies are 21 percentage 
points more likely to report their training to be general; for the other two ranges, 16-100 
and more-than-100, the estimated effects are 34-36 percentage points.  Unlike in the NLSY 
data, these effects are statistically significant at conventional levels.  Furthermore, the 
pattern of effects across size categories suggests that the effect of market size becomes 
negligible beyond a certain point, as in the analysis of turnover.  Increases in market size 
from less-than-5 to 5-15 and from 5-15 to 16-100 both increase generality, but increases in 
market size beyond 100 firms do not increase generality.    25 
While these results are consistent with the predictions of the Stevens model, they 
are also consistent with another explanation.  Suppose, for instance, that training and 
equipment in a given occupation is the same in all firms in all areas.  For example, suppose 
that all printing firms use the same type of printing press, so that printing press operators 
learn the same skills regardless of where they work.  In this case, training would be 
perfectly general in all areas, at least in a technological sense.  However, the size of the 
local market might influence the perceived generality of the training.  In areas with few 
printing firms, knowing how to operate the common press may not appear to be a general 
skill in the context of the local labor market because the skills are applicable at only a few 
local firms.  In areas with many printing firms, by contrast, the same skills would appear to 
be quite general.  This pattern of perceptions would generate a positive relationship 
between generality (as reported in surveys) and local market size. 
The Stevens model predicts, on the other hand, that training requirements and 
equipment truly vary (in a technological sense) across local markets of different sizes.  For 
example, in small markets the model predicts that each printing firm would use a specific 
(different) type of press.  In large markets, by contrast, all printing firms would use the 
same (common) type of press.  In terms of the observed relationship between market size 
and generality, the “perception” explanation is presumably present in any event.  At issue 
is whether the mechanism emphasized in the Stevens model is also present. 
One way to distinguish between the effects of market size on the perceived versus 
technological generality of training is by examining the value to a worker’s current 
employer of the worker’s previous experience in related jobs.  Employers in the EOPP 
survey were asked how many months of the worker’s previous work experience had some    26 
application to the current job.  The answers to this question provide a rough indicator of 
occupation-specific experience.  In my sample, workers have an average of 3.7 years of 
“relevant” experience, compared to an average of 9.6 years of potential labor-market 
experience (age minus years of education minus 6). 
If training in a given occupation were the same in every firm in every area, then a 
given amount of relevant experience would have the same value to the current employer in 
every area.  If, on the other hand, the generality of training truly varies across areas of 
different size, relevant experience is more valuable in larger markets because the training is 
more general.  The value of relevant experience to employers in the EOPP data can be 
judged using the starting hourly wage of the last worker hired.  I estimate a wage 
regression in which the log wage is a function of potential experience, relevant experience, 
education, and market size.  In one specification I also include a set of control variables to 
account for such factors as industry, occupation, and union status.  The overall return to 
relevant experience is 4.3 percent per year in the specification without controls and 2.9 
percent in the specification with controls (Table 9, columns 1 and 3). 
I allow the returns to relevant experience to vary with market size by adding 
interaction terms between relevant experience and the indicators for the three highest 
market-size categories.  The Stevens model predicts that these coefficients are positive, 
whereas the “perceptions only” view implies that these coefficients are zero.  In the 
specification without controls, these coefficients are all positive and statistically significant 
(Table 9, column 2).  Furthermore, the estimated effects are economically significant in 
magnitude: the implied returns to relevant experience are 2.4 percent for the smallest 
market-size category (less than 5 companies) and 4.6-5.2 percent for the other categories.     27 
As in the case of reported generality, increases in market size do not matter beyond a 
certain point.  However, the threshold is much lower in this case: 5 companies compared to 
100 companies in the case of reported generality. 
Adding the control variables reduces the overall return to relevant experience, but 
the pattern of returns by market size is similar to the specification without controls.  The 
implied returns are 1.5 percent for the smallest category and 3.2-3.7 percent for the other 
categories.  Compared to the specification without controls, the coefficient on the 16-100 
interaction term is of similar magnitude, while the coefficients on the 5-15 and more-than-
100 interaction terms are smaller. 
Taken together, these results generally support the prediction of the Stevens model 
that the true generality of training increases with market size.  Since the returns to relevant 
experience are larger in larger markets, the relationship between generality and market size 
reflects more than simply perceptions.  Furthermore, the results indicate that the effects of 
market size on the generality of training exist primarily at the lowest levels of market size. 
The positive impact of market size on generality can be interpreted as an external 
economy of scale from a concentration of firms employing workers in a given occupation.  
Since on-the-job training is more general the greater is the market size, when workers 
move between employers in the same area, their relevant experience is more valuable.  
This increases productivity and wages.  This finding is consistent with Glaeser and Mare’s 
(2001) argument that cities speed the accumulation of human capital. 
6. Conclusion 
  The Stevens (1994) model extends the Becker (1964) model of job training to allow 
for explicit consideration of market size.  The model highlights the link between labor-   28 
market size and the incentive to invest in firm-specific capital.  With smaller markets, 
firms face less competition for their trained workers and thus experience less turnover in 
their workforces.  As a result, firms have a greater incentive to invest in firm-specific 
skills.  Thus, the model predicts that as market size increases, turnover increases and 
training becomes more general.   
The empirical evidence in this analysis generally supports the theoretical 
predictions.  In the case of both turnover and type of training, variation in occupation-
specific market size is important primarily at low levels of market size.  This suggests that 
the Stevens model is most relevant to cases where occupation-specific skills are 
transferable to a relatively small number of firms.  Specifically for the blue-collar 
occupations considered here, the relevant range is less than 10 firms.  Straightforward 
calculations indicate that roughly 15-20 percent of blue-collar workers in the United States 
fall in this range.
22   
                                                            
 
22 This estimate includes workers in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas.  For workers in 
metropolitan areas, the OES data indicate that 3.27% of blue-collar workers have 10 or fewer local 
establishments that employ their occupation.  Workers outside metropolitan areas are not covered by the OES 
data, but the relevant percentage for them can be approximated based on OES data for workers in the 
smallest metropolitan areas.  In areas with total population between 50,000 and 100,000, 17% of blue-collar 
workers have 10 or fewer local establishments that employ their occupation.  It is therefore plausible that the 
relevant percentage for workers in non-metropolitan areas is 45-65%.  Given that metropolitan areas contain 
72.6% of the blue-collar workers in the nation (based on my CPS sample), those numbers imply that 15-20% 
of blue-collar workers nationwide face small local markets for their skills.    29 
Appendix A. Derivation of Theoretical Model for Special Case 
  This appendix analyzes a special case of the model of job training developed by 
Stevens (1994).  Compared to the discussion of the general case in the text, restricting 
attention to a special case allows me to derive closed-form solutions for the training 
outcomes.  This special case involves two restrictions on the general case: (1) no specific 




  The post-training productivity of the worker is given by: 
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A.2 Expected Returns 
 
  I solve the model by starting at the labor-market stage, where the  1 + n  firms 
observe v and make simultaneous wage offers.  Let 
1 v  and 
2 v  be the highest and second 
highest of the values  i v ,  n i ,..., 1 , 0 = .  The outcome of this competition is that the worker 
works at the firm for which he has the highest value, 
1 v , at a wage equal to the second 
highest value 
2 v .  Ex-post, the total value of the training is 
1 v , which is shared between the 
worker, who receives 
2 v , and the firm that has the highest value, which receives 
2 1 v v − .  
The next step involves calculating the expected returns to the training for the worker and 
each firm. 
 
  Under the assumptions of this special case, I derive the expected returns following 
the integrals presented by Stevens (1994) for the general case.  (The following formulas 
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A.3 Effect of Market Size on Expected Returns 
 
  With these formulas, we can investigate how the outcomes of the training problem 
(for a given level of training) are affected by a change in the size of the external market, n.  
(This exercise treats n as a continuous variable.)  The total return increases with n 












Notice that the expected return to each external firm is the same as the expected return to 
the training firm:  0 / R n X = .  This follows from the lack of a specific element in the 
productivity vector v.  Therefore,  
  0 ]





















The return to each firm, including the training firm, decreases with n: with a larger 
market, it is more likely that another firm has the highest value.  For the same reason, it is 













The worker’s wage in the second period increases with n because the gap between 
1 v  and 










Rw . (A.11) 
Note that, in expected terms, workers are paid less than their productivity:  R Rw <  for any 
∞ < n .  This has the flavor of the specific-capital model, even though training is 
transferable.  However, as n increases, the wage increases and the gap between pay and 
productivity falls.  Also, as  ∞ → n , ) 1 ( + → m Rw , which is the expected productivity  ) (m  
plus the maximum productivity shock (1).
23 
 
A.4 The Training Decision 
                                                            
 
23 Stevens (1994) shows that for any distribution of  i ε , (A.8)-(A.11) hold with weak inequalities.  A caveat is 
that  0 ≥ ∂ ∂ n Rw may not hold for some distributions.  However, Stevens argues that a sufficient condition for 
it to hold is that  F  be log-concave, which is true for a wide class of distributions including the uniform 
distribution considered here.    31 
 
  The training firm and the worker choose the level of training that maximizes their 
joint private return less the cost of training.  The joint expected private return is the sum of 
the return to the training firm and the worker’s wage: 
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Assume that the cost of training  ) (m C  is increasing and convex in m :  0 ) ( > ′ m C , 
0 ) ( > ′ ′ m C .  The equilibrium level of training 
* m  satisfies the first order condition: 
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It follows from (A.12) that the marginal private benefit of m  is 1: an increase in m  raises 
the worker’s productivity in each of the  1 + n  firms and thus increases his wage in direct 
proportion to the increase in m .  Therefore, the equilibrium level 
* m  is independent of n 
and determined by the cost function: 
 1 ) (







Given this result and the fact that I am ignoring the specific component, the effect 
of market size on training outcomes, in equilibrium, is given by the direct effects in (A.8)-
(A.11) above.  The firm returns and the probability of turnover do not depend on m .  The 
worker return and the total return depend on m , but since 
* m  is independent of n, there is 
no indirect effect of n through 
* m .  As described in the text, the general case is more 
interesting in this regard.    32 
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Table 1. Differences in Geographic Mobility across Occupation Groups 
 
  Percent Moving between States 
Occupation Group  1989 to 1990  1985 to 1990 
Occupation 
Share (%) 
White-Collar 4.5  12.9  33 
Clerical/Sales/Service 3.7  9.6  37 
Blue-Collar 3.1  7.1  30 
Total 3.7  10.0  100 
 
Sources: March 1990 CPS [for 1989 to 1990]; 1990 Census of Population [for 1985 to 1990]. 
 
Notes: Sample is full-time workers in civilian labor force, age 18-64.  Sample excludes those who were living 
abroad in 1985 or 1989 and those in farming, forestry, or fishing occupations.  Occupation group is based on 
occupation in 1990.  All data are weighted by sampling weights.  White-collar occupations include 
managerial, professional specialty, and technical occupations.  Clerical/Sales/Service occupations include 
sales, service, clerical, and administrative support occupations.  Blue-collar occupations include precision 
production, craft, and repair occupations; and operators, fabricators, and laborers. 
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Table 2. Market-Size Summary Statistics 
 
    Number of Establishments 
       Percentile 




All  Observations  17,231 43  95  6 17 93 
Observations  in  CPS  Sample 10,004 62  120  8 27  137 
 
Sources: Occupational Employment Statistics survey, 1998; March 1990-2002 CPS.    37 
Table 3. Sample Means, CPS Sample 
 




Number of Observations  90,945  10,004 
Multiple Employers  0.15  0.16 
Female 0.20  0.19 
Education:    
  Less than High School  0.25  0.22 
  High School / Some College  0.70  0.74 
  College Graduate or More  0.05  0.05 
Age:    
  Less than 30  0.27  0.28 
  30 to 45  0.47  0.47 
  Greater than 45  0.26  0.25 
Race / Ethnicity:     
  White  0.62  0.72 
  Black  0.10  0.10 
  Hispanic  0.24  0.14 
  Other  0.04  0.04 
Population of MA (1999)  2,638,621  1,263,913 
Population Growth of MA (1990-1999)  10.52%  10.69% 
Union 0.06  0.06 
Part Time  0.06  0.06 
Public Sector  0.04  0.05 
Firm Size:     
  Less than 25 Employees  0.25  0.27 
  25-99 Employees  0.19  0.18 
  100-499 Employees  0.18  0.18 
  500-999 Employees  0.06  0.06 
  1000+ Employees  0.32  0.31 
Industry:    
  Construction  0.18  0.21 
  Manufacturing – Nondurable Goods  0.16  0.15 
  Manufacturing – Durable Goods  0.25  0.25 
  Transportation/Public Utilities  0.14  0.10 
  Wholesale/Retail Trade  0.12  0.11 
  Services  0.13  0.16 
  Other  0.01  0.02 
 
Source: March 1990-2002 CPS. 
 
Note: In the group-level sample, variables represent averages over workers in the occupation/metropolitan 
area (MA). 
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Table 4. Job Turnover and Market Size: Main Results 
 
  Specification 
Independent Variable  (1) (2) 
Market Size: Establishments  7.59 x 10
-6  
  (8.70 x 10
-6)  
Market Size: Establishments (≤10)    4.00 x 10
-3 
    (1.99 x 10
-3) 
Market Size: Establishments (10-30)    -3.82 x 10
-5 
    (4.19 x 10
-4) 
Market Size: Establishments (30+)    1.10 x 10
-5 
    (1.00 x 10
-5) 
Female -0.023  -0.023 
 (0.010)  (0.010) 
Education: Less than High School  -0.026  -0.026 
 (0.008)  (0.008) 
Age: Less than 30  0.117  0.117 
 (0.010)  (0.010) 
Age: 30 to 45  0.036  0.036 
 (0.007)  (0.007) 
Race: Nonwhite  -0.035  -0.035 
 (0.007)  (0.007) 
Log (Population of MA)  -0.008  -0.009 
 (0.002)  (0.003) 
Population Growth of MA  1.79 x 10
-3  1.79 x 10
-3 
  (2.63 x 10
-4)  (2.64 x 10
-4) 
Union -0.010  -0.009 
 (0.014)  (0.015) 
Part Time  0.058  0.058 
 (0.018)  (0.018) 
Public Sector  -0.041  -0.041 
 (0.017)  (0.017) 
Firm Size: 25-99 Employees  -0.009  -0.010 
 (0.012)  (0.012) 
Firm Size: 100-499 Employees  -0.019  -0.020 
 (0.012)  (0.012) 
Firm Size: 500-999 Employees  -0.018  -0.018 
 (0.015)  (0.015) 
Firm Size: 1000+ Employees  -0.031  -0.032 
 (0.011)  (0.010) 
    
Industry Controls (7 categories)  Yes  Yes 
Year Controls (13 years)  Yes  Yes 
Occupation Fixed Effects (100 occupations)  Yes  Yes 
    
R
2 0.53  0.53 
 
Source: March 1990-2002 CPS. 
 
Notes: Sample size is 10,004.  By range of establishments, sample sizes are: 1,834 (≤10), 3,568 (11-30), and 
4,602 (31+).  The dependent variable is the share of workers with multiple employers; mean is 0.16.  In 
specification (2), the coefficients on the market-size variables represent the effect of market size in the 
indicated range of establishments.  Standard errors, in parentheses, are calculated using the method of Huber-
White and allow for arbitrary clustering at the metropolitan-area (MA) level.  The omitted categories are: for 
age, Greater than 45; for firm size, Less than 25 Employees.    39 
Table 5. Job Turnover and Market Size: Variation with Training Time 
 
  Specification 
Independent Variable (1)  (2) 
Market Size: Establishments  3.40 x 10
-7  
  (1.36 x 10
-5)  
Market Size: Establishments (≤10)    3.54 x 10
-3 
    (4.45 x 10
-3) 
Market Size: Establishments (10-30)    -1.88 x 10
-4 
    (6.72 x 10
-4) 
Market Size: Establishments (30+)    4.24 x 10
-6 
    (1.47 x 10
-5) 
Establishments × Training Time  4.23 x 10
-7  
  (4.48 x 10
-7)  
Establishments (≤10) × Training Time    1.49 x 10
-5 
    (1.38 x 10
-4) 
Establishments (10-30) × Training Time    7.29 x 10
-6 
    (2.17 x 10
-5) 
Establishments (30+) × Training Time    4.10 x 10
-7 
    (4.52 x 10
-7) 
 
Source: March 1990-2002 CPS. 
 
Notes: Training time is measured in months.  Regressions also include the control variables listed in Table 4.  
Sample size is 10,004.  By range of establishments, sample sizes are: 1,834 (≤10), 3,568 (11-30), and 4,602 
(31+).  The dependent variable is the share of workers with multiple employers; mean is 0.16.  In 
specification (2), the coefficients on the market-size variables represent the effect of market size in the 
indicated range of establishments.  Standard errors, in parentheses, are calculated using the method of Huber-
White and allow for arbitrary clustering at the metropolitan-area level. 
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Table 6. Incidence and Generality of Training at Start of Job, NLSY Sample 
 








Classes and Seminars  46  6  18  0.83 
Supervisor Show You  167  23  65  0.63 
Co-Workers Show You  188  25  74  0.63 
Self-Study  Materials  86 12 34  0.58 
Total 251  34  98  0.64 
 
Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, survey year 1993. 
 
Notes: Generality is calculated using 1993 sample weights.  In the last row, 251 is the number of workers 
reporting at least one kind of training and 0.64 is the average generality over all kinds reported.  
a Sample size = 739 (Those who initially performed 100% of duties are assumed to have not received 
training.) 
b Sample size = 255 (Those who initially performed less than 100% of their current duties adequately) 
c Generality: Share of those reporting who say that “all or almost all” of the skills learned in the training 
program would be useful in doing the same kind of work for a different employer. 
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Table 7. Generality of Training and Market Size, NLSY Sample 
 
Independent Variable   
Market Size: 31 to 100 Establishments  0.114 
 (0.080) 
Market Size: More than 100 Establishments  0.105 
 (0.082) 
Training Kind: Classes and Seminars  0.219 
 (0.071) 
Training Kind: Supervisor Show You  0.042 
 (0.057) 








Race: Nonwhite  -0.074 
 (0.058) 




Part Time  0.012 
 (0.135) 
Public Sector  -0.231 
 (0.147) 
Log (Firm Size)  -0.010 
 (0.016) 
  
Industry Controls (6 categories)  Yes 





Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, survey year 1993. 
 
Notes: Sample size is 474.  The dependent variable equals 1 if “all or almost all of the skills” learned in 
training would be useful in doing the same kind of work for a different employer; and equals 0 otherwise.  
The mean of the dependent variable is 0.63.  Standard errors, in parentheses, account for clustering of 
observations by occupation/metropolitan area (MA).  The omitted categories are: for market size, 30 or Less 
Establishments; for training kind: Self-Study Materials. 
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Table 8. Generality of Training and Market Size, EOPP Sample 
 
Independent Variable   
Market Size: 5 to 15 Companies  0.212 
 (0.075) 
Market Size: 16 to 100 Companies  0.362 
 (0.068) 








Log (Total Private Employment in Area)  -0.015 
 (0.025) 
Union (Percent Unionized in Firm)  0.000 
 (0.001) 
Part Time  0.111 
 (0.079) 
Log (Firm Size)  -0.007 
 (0.014) 
  
Industry Controls (7 categories)  Yes 





Source: Employment Opportunity Pilot Project, 1982 employer survey. 
 
Notes: Sample size is 421.  The dependent variable equals 1 if “almost all” of the skills learned by new 
employees would be useful outside the company; and equals 0 otherwise.  The mean of the dependent 
variable is 0.63.  Standard errors, in parentheses, account for the clustering and stratification in the survey 
design.  The omitted category for market size is Less than 5 Companies. 
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Table 9. Market Size and the Returns to Relevant Experience 
 
  Specification 
Independent Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Potential  Experience  (Years)  0.022 0.023 0.018 0.018 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
(Potential Experience)
2  -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0003 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Relevant  Experience  (Years)  0.043 0.024 0.029 0.015 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
(Relevant Experience)
2  -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0009 -0.0012 
  (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Relevant Experience × 5-15 Companies    0.026    0.017 
   (0.010)  (0.012) 
Relevant Experience ×  16-100  Companies   0.022  0.022 
   (0.010)  (0.011) 
Relevant Experience × More than 100 Companies    0.028    0.019 
   (0.010)  (0.012) 
Years  of  Education  0.013 0.011 0.027 0.027 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Previous  Vocational  Training  (1=yes)  0.118 0.118 0.053 0.055 
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.034) (0.034) 
Log (Total Private Employment in Area)  -0.049  -0.050  -0.020  -0.019 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Market Size: 5-15 Companies  0.017  -0.045  -0.020  -0.053 
  (0.047) (0.053) (0.046) (0.056) 
Market Size: 16-100 Companies  0.092  0.047  0.051  -0.000 
  (0.048) (0.056) (0.046) (0.053) 
Market Size: More than 100 Companies  0.113  0.037  0.009  -0.034 
  (0.054) (0.063) (0.052) (0.064) 
Constant  1.825 1.899 1.305 1.340 
  (0.242) (0.244) (0.255) (0.252) 
      
Other Controls  No  No  Yes  Yes 
      
Observations  408 408 362 362 
R
2  0.19 0.20 0.45 0.45 
 
Source: Employment Opportunity Pilot Project, 1982 employer survey. 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of the starting hourly wage.  The mean wage is $6.20 and the 
mean of the log wage is $1.74.  Other Controls are gender, union, firm size, part-time employment, 
temporary or seasonal employment, industry (7 categories), and occupation (5 categories).  Standard errors, 
in parentheses, account for the clustering and stratification in the survey design.  The omitted categories are: 
for relevant experience × market size, relevant experience × Less than 5 Companies; for market size, Less 
than 5 Companies. 
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